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NAVIGATING THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
CONSIDERATIONS OF EQUITABLE IMPACT AFTER
UNITED STATES V. TRINIDAD
JONATHAN S. PETREE*
I. INTRODUCTION
IN UNITED STATES V. TRINIDAD, the First Circuit held thatan illiterate, uneducated, and technologically-impaired indi-
vidual acted as a “navigator” by virtue of keeping a boat on
course from Colombia to Puerto Rico, thus subjecting him to a
two-level sentencing enhancement in criminal proceedings for
trafficking narcotics.1 In so doing, the majority furthered prece-
dent that broadly applies the Federal Sentencing Guideline’s
sentencing enhancement for controlled substance commerce
involving a defendant who acts as “a pilot, copilot, captain, [or]
navigator,” irrespective of any special skill actually possessed by a
defendant.2 In response, Circuit Judge Torruella’s dissent in
Trinidad illustrates the seemingly arbitrary impact that the ma-
jority’s broad statutory interpretation yields and posits signifi-
cant arguments from equity against such broad application of
the sentencing enhancements.3 Although precedent supports
the majority’s broad reading of § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C), the plain in-
equity and lack of persuasive reasoning in the majority opinion
results in the arbitrary furthering of overly punitive distribution
of “justice.”4
* Jonathan Petree is a candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2019, at SMU Dedman
School of Law. He received his B.A. in Philosophy with a minor focus in History
from The University of Arkansas in 2016. Jonathan would like to thank the SMU
Law Review Association for providing assistance in publishing this casenote and
would like to thank his parents for their encouragement, guidance, and support.
1 United States v. Trinidad, 839 F.3d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 2016).
2 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016); Trinidad, 839 F.3d at 115; see United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 811
F.3d 1172, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2016).
3 Trinidad, 839 F.3d at 119–20 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 115–16.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In this case, the defendant, “Persis Trinidad[,] was convicted
of violating the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act” but ap-
pealed the issue of whether a sentencing enhancement applied
to him for acting as “a pilot, copilot, captain, navigator, flight
officer, or any other operation officer” while aboard “a vessel
carrying controlled substances.”5 Trinidad was an illiterate forty-
six-year-old citizen of the Dominican Republic who held the
equivalent of a sixth-grade education, spoke only Spanish, and
“eked out a living . . . earning about $150 a month” as a fisher-
man.6 In the course of his work, Trinidad was approached by an
individual offering $20,000—more money than he could hope
to make in eleven years—to go “to Columbia and bring[ ] back
narcotics by [boat] to Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.”7
Trinidad accepted the individual’s offer and was thereafter
flown to Columbia with all expenses and logistics handled by
others within the operation.8 On September 24, 2014, Trinidad
and Coa-Pen˜a (the codefendant in the case) embarked on the
voyage home. Coa-Pen˜a handled the GPS because of Trinidad’s
“apparent inability” to use the technology, but “both took turns
steering the vessel.”9 Somewhere eighty miles outside of the Do-
minican Republic, the boat’s engine stalled, leaving the defend-
ants stranded until the United States Coast Guard arrived.10
Neither Trinidad nor Coa-Pen˜a asserted ownership of the boat.
However, “one of them orally claimed Colombian nationality for
the vessel.”11 After “the Colombian government responded that
it could neither confirm nor deny” the vessel’s registration in
Colombia, the Coast Guard boarded the vessel and found 144.9
kilograms of cocaine on the boat.12 The defendants were then
brought into Puerto Rico, and Trinidad pled guilty to possession
with the intent to distribute.13
At the district court, Trinidad admitted to taking turns driving
the boat with Coa-Pen˜a.14 The district court applied the
5 Id. at 113.
6 Id. at 117.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 118.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 118–19.
13 Id. at 119.
14 Id. at 114.
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§ 2D1.1(b)(3)(C) enhancement “because it found that Trinidad
navigated the vessel under the circumstances.”15 After being sen-
tenced to imprisonment for 108 months, Trinidad appealed to
the First Circuit regarding the two-level enhancement for acting
as a “navigator” within the meaning of § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C).16
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 2D1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines relates to
the unlawful manufacturing, importing, exporting, or traffick-
ing of drugs.17 More specifically, the Guidelines provide:
If the defendant unlawfully imported or exported a controlled
substance under circumstances in which (A) an aircraft other
than a regularly scheduled commercial air carrier was used to
import or export the controlled substance, (B) a submersible ves-
sel or semi-submersible vessel as described in 18 U.S.C. § 2285
was used, or (C) the defendant acted as a pilot, copilot, captain,
navigator, flight officer, or any other operation officer aboard
any craft or vessel carrying a controlled substance, increase by 2
levels.18
Other circuits have uniformly adopted a broad reading of the
Guideline’s classifications for enhancement, rejecting the neces-
sity of “formal training” or “special skills” to be considered a pi-
lot, copilot, or navigator.19 The issue raised by Trinidad
implicates the applicability of the statutory designation naviga-
tor, for the defendant specifically contended “he did not use the
GPS” and thus “cannot be said to have been navigating.”20 Fur-
ther, Trinidad urged the First Circuit to depart from its sister
circuits’ precedent, arguing that a person can qualify as a navi-
gator only if that person possesses a special skill like knowing
“how to program or adjust a GPS.”21
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.
18 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(3).
19 See United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 811 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2016) (hold-
ing that the plain language of § 2D1.1(b)(3) is “strongly indicative of a broad
scope . . .”); United States v. Bautista-Montelongo, 618 F.3d 464, 465–67 (5th Cir.
2010) (holding that the captain/pilot enhancement requires no professional or
higher-degree of skill); United States v. Cartwright, 413 F.3d 1295, 1298–99 (11th
Cir. 2005) (holding that the defendant qualified for the enhancement as a navi-
gator simply because he drove the boat and used a compass).
20 Trinidad, 839 F.3d at 115.
21 Id.
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A. MAJORITY REASONING
The majority held that Trinidad acted as a navigator during
the trip from Colombia to the Dominican Republic based on
the district court’s conclusion that “Trinidad must have relied
on the GPS to keep the boat on course.”22 The court reasoned
that it would be impossible to get on a boat, be told “that way,”
and successfully reach your destination—after all, “it’s a big
ocean up there.”23 Furthermore, the majority rejected Trini-
dad’s contention that he must possess some special skill in order
to be deemed a navigator, stating “[n]othing in the text or com-
mentary of the enhancement supports such a restricted defini-
tion of the term ‘navigator.’”24
To support the broader, more inclusive reading of terms
within the Guidelines, the First Circuit relied on a sister court’s
decision in United States v. Cruz-Mendez for the proposition that
no special skill is needed to warrant such classification.25 There,
the Ninth Circuit held that the “plain language of
§ 2D1.1(b)(3)(C) . . . is strongly indicative of a broad scope, not
dependent on a finding of any particular formal training or type
of boat.”26 Therefore, a fisherman hired to operate a marijuana-
laden boat in open water was justifiably subjected to the Guide-
line’s two-step enhancement.27 Arguing further for Trinidad’s
classification as a navigator, the majority cited various dictiona-
ries defining “navigate” to mean sailing, directing, or managing
a ship on its course.28 Because Trinidad steered the boat, and
because the court had inferred that Trinidad must have relied
on the GPS to keep the boat on course, the majority concluded
that he acted as a navigator and was thus subject to the two-level
sentencing enhancement.29
B. DISSENT’S REASONING
In the dissent, Circuit Judge Torruella elucidated the absurd





26 United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 811 F.3d 1172, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2016).
27 Id. at 1176.
28 See Trinidad, 839 F.3d at 115 (citing THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 259
(2d ed. 1989); THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1282
(2d ed. 1987); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1509 (1981)).
29 Id. at 114.
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jority’s reading of the term navigator.30 Torruella argued that
navigator is an inherently narrow term containing “its own par-
ticular subset of skills.”31 In furtherance of that argument, the
dissent cited the Sea Talk Nautical Dictionary to define navigate
as “[t]o safely operate a vessel employing the elements of posi-
tion, course and speed” and “[t]o determine position, course,
and speed using instruments.”32 The nautical dictionary’s more
pointed definition “embraces the notion that in nautical terms
‘to navigate’ actually requires extra abilities to determine ‘posi-
tion, course, and speed using instruments.’”33 Applying that def-
inition to the facts of the principal case, the dissent concluded
that Trinidad failed to meet the definitional criterion to navi-
gate because “[h]e specifically did not understand how to use
the GPS.”34 While Trinidad did not deny taking turns steering
the boat, it was “undisputed” that he was incapable of using the
GPS and left management of that instrument to Coa-Pen˜a.35
Thus, the dissent argued that classifying Trinidad as a naviga-
tor—and thereby subjecting him to the Guideline’s sentencing
enhancement—was an “obviously unjust result.”36
Through reductio ad absurdum, the dissent proceeds to illus-
trate the inequitable impact that flowed from the majority’s
broader understanding of the term navigator.37 Assuming the
broader definition in which no special skill is required, “subur-
ban or rural drug dealers should receive an enhanced sentence
simply because they drive a car . . . rather than walk or take
public transportation as their more urban counterparts
might.”38 Underlying that reasoning is the irrational notion that
merely driving warrants enhanced culpability.39 The dissent con-
cluded by relaying the inequitable result in Trinidad’s present
situation: Trinidad was a coastal small-boat fisherman, whose
only presently applicable skill was being able to “help manage
30 Id. at 119–20 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 119 (Torruella, J., dissenting).




33 Trinidad, 839 F.3d at 119–20 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 120 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
35 Id. (Torruella, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 119 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 120 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
38 Id. (Torruella, J., dissenting).
39 Id. (Torruella, J., dissenting).
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the boat” on the voyage from Colombia to the Dominican Re-
public.40 Trinidad’s behavior did not warrant extra culpability or
a sentence enhancement as compared to the action of “the com-
mon ‘mules’ that sit in commercial airlines, transporting contra-
band in and on their bodies, for which they are not penalized
additionally . . . .”41 Thus, the dissent concluded that Trinidad
lacked the requisite skills to be considered a navigator and suf-
fered an inequitable result at the hand of the majority’s overly
broad reading of § 2D1.1(b)(3).42
IV. THE MAJORITY’S BROAD STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION IS UNWARRANTED
AND INEQUITABLE
Absent legislative intent suggesting that criminal culpability
for merely operating a boat or plane—but not a car—in com-
merce is warranted, the majority seems to have no non-arbitrary
reason outside of sister court precedent to support the plain in-
equity and apparent obfuscation of § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C)’s statutory
language.43 Although stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles”44
and thus provides some persuasive effect for the majority’s deci-
sion, the First Circuit was not bound to follow the reasoning of
the other circuits.45 Absent that imperative, little reason stands
to support the majority’s determination that Trinidad acted as a
navigator.
The majority inferred that Trinidad must have used the GPS
device based on the assumption that it would be “impossible” to
cross the ocean from Colombia to the Dominican Republic with-
out the use of such an instrument.46 This assumption is plainly
erroneous considering that global positioning devices are rela-
tively new47 and that, since antiquity, mankind has conquered
the open ocean. Thus, the assumption of impossibility underly-
40 Id. (Torruella, J., dissenting).
41 Id. (Torruella, J., dissenting).
42 See id. at 119–20 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
43 See generally id. at 112–17 (majority opinion).
44 Timothy Owen, Stare Decisis, WEX (Mar. 2017), https://www.law.cornell
.edu/wex/stare_decisis [https://perma.cc/AG4E-2KZE] (citing Kimble v. Marvel
Entertainment, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015)).
45 Id.
46 Trinidad, 839 F.3d at 115.
47 Thuy Mai, Global Positioning History, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/director-
ates/heo/scan/communications/policy/GPS_History.html [https://perma.cc/
89QG-2ARZ].
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ing the majority’s inference is plainly wrong in light of a com-
mon sense consideration of empirical and historical evidence.
Furthermore, Trinidad specifically contended that he did not
use the GPS, and it is “undisputed that Coa-Pen˜a managed those
instruments throughout the trip.”48 The majority therefore
erred in applying the two-level sentencing enhancement to Trin-
idad as a navigator based on fallacious inferential reasoning.49
The First Circuit’s understanding of the statutory term naviga-
tor is also subject to critique. The majority held that “nothing in
the text or commentary of the enhancement supports [Trini-
dad’s] restricted definition of the term ‘navigator.’”50 “[I]n in-
terpreting a statute a court . . . must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says
there.”51 Arguably, a plain reading of § 2D1.1(b)(3)’s language
implies that some special skill is required; if no special skill were
necessary then one might question why the drafters used sui
generis titles indicative of learned skills (such as pilot, copilot,
captain or navigator) rather than broad, general language
preventing the steering, directing, or manipulation of a vessel,
for example.52 Because a plain reading of the Guidelines ought
to be preferred,53 and because such a plain reading ostensibly
implies a requirement of some special skill, the majority’s overly
broad statutory interpretation ought to be rejected.
Finally, no case in the Federal Circuit exists in which the court
has refused to classify a defendant as a “pilot, copilot, captain,
navigator, flight officer, or any other operation officer”—an ob-
servation telling of the overinclusive and overpunitive impact
that such a broad interpretation of § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C) yields. The
majority’s interpretation of the Guideline’s language substan-
tially impacts drug trafficking cases related to boating and avia-
tion law. For instance, while the designation “pilot” brings to
mind an individual with the capacity and requisite skills neces-
sary to safely operate a plane, the majority’s obfuscation of the
word’s plain meaning mandates that anyone with the unmiti-
gated audacity to merely steer the vessel be classified a pilot.54
Contrast that notion with the crimes committed by one Arevalo-
48 Trinidad, 839 F.3d at 115, 120.
49 See id. at 112–17 (majority opinion).
50 Id. at 115.
51 Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).
52 See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C).
53 Germain, 503 U.S. at 253–54.
54 See Trinidad, 839 F.3d at 115.
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Kessler—a Mexican air force captain who used his expertise to
pilot aircraft to and from Venezuela, Panama, and Mexico for
the Sinaloa Cartel.55 Arevalo-Kessler’s “education and his ability
to fly the planes” provide a specific example of where
§ 2D1.1(b)(3)(C)’s sentencing enhancement ought to be ap-
plied—a normative evaluation lacking similar foundation in
Trinidad’s instant case.56
V. CONCLUSION
The majority found that Trinidad’s actions merited an en-
hanced criminal sentence pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C).57
While precedent from neighboring circuits persuaded the court
to broadly apply the sentencing enhancement, mere appeal to
tradition fails to warrant the inequitable and overly punitive de-
cision reached by the majority. Furthermore, a plain reading of
the statutory language of § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C) suggests not the
overly broad interpretation adopted by the majority but an ap-
plication of the sentencing enhancement reasonably limited by
the statute’s inherently narrow terminology.58 Because of the in-
equitable impact faced by Trinidad and the overly punitive im-
pact such broad statutory interpretation has on commerce, the
majority should have abandoned the views of the other circuits
and declined to enhance Trinidad’s sentence.
55 Robert Beckhusen, The Sinaloa Cartel Has More Planes Than Mexico’s Biggest
Airline, MOTHERBOARD (May 9, 2016, 9:15AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/
en_us/article/vv7bwb/the-sinaloa-cartel-has-more-planes-than-mexicos-biggest-
airline [https://perma.cc/GY4D-F35V].
56 Id.; see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C); Trinidad, 839 F.3d at 114–15.
57 Trinidad, 839 F.3d at 115.
58 See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C).
